Hong Kong, July 15 (ANI): China views space as a critical military domain, just as it does the land, sea and air.

While China's space program is a source of national pride, its authoritarian leader Chairman Xi Jinping aims to displace the USA as the leading space power. This explains the enormous investment Beijing is pouring into scientific, civil and military space assets.

So what progress is China making? The US Space Force, in an updated space threat fact sheet published in April, described China's and Russia's advances as 'a serious threat to US national security interests in, from and to space'. In fact, the release warned starkly, 'China is the pacing challenge and is rapidly improving its space capabilities to track and target US military forces. China and Russia are pursuing a wide range of counter-space capabilities to disrupt and degrade US space capabilities.'

The statistics are certainly impressive. Last year, China conducted 68 space launches. Cumulatively, these rocket launches placed 260 individual payloads into orbit, of which 67 - or 26 per cent - were satellites capable of performing intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR).

Phenomenally, China's on-orbit presence has snowballed 620 per cent in the past decade. It now has more than 1,060 satellites in orbit, which is 875 more than it had in 2015. Of this array of satellites, more than 510 can perform ISR for the People's Liberation Army (PLA) using a range of optical, multispectral, radar or radiofrequency sensors.

Such a satellite network can comb the Earth's surface looking for American aircraft carriers, air wings or other expeditionary assets, for example.

A significant example of such an ISR satellite is the remote-sensing TJS-12 launched into geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO) in December 2024. The US Space Force claimed, 'The satellite could allow China to persistently monitor US and allied forces in the Pacific region.'

Dr Andrew Erickson, Professor of Strategy at the US Naval War College, commented, 'Of fundamental concern is the sheer number of satellites China now has in orbit, particularly for ISR, as part of its systematically building out a comprehensive, capable reconnaissance-strike complex.'

To rival the likes of Starlink, China is also creating a proliferated constellation of G60 communications satellites in low Earth orbit (LEO). By early 2025, 72 were already orbiting the Earth, with 648 expected by year's end. Later, by 2030, a planned 14,000 of these communications satellites will be encircling the Earth. Another Chinese company, the China Satellite Network Group, launched ten communications satellites in 2024, the first of a planned proliferated LEO constellation of 13,000 satellites. Incidentally, after observing Ukraine's use of Starlink in its war against Russia, China is concerned about that network and SpaceX's relationship with the US government.

It fears, perhaps in an overreaction, that these satellites could transmit data and engender new combat styles for the USA.

Weapon targeting is another critical utilisation of Chinese space-based assets. Concernedly, the US military stated, 'China's improving space-based capabilities combine with the PLA's growing arsenal of long-range precision weapons to enable long-range precision strikes against US and allied forces.'

In 2015, China publicly announced space was 'a new domain of warfare'. At that time, it organised space capabilities under the newly formed PLA Strategic Support Force, although this was duly dissolved on 19 April 2024. For managing space assets, it was superseded by the PLA Aerospace Force, whose purpose is leveraging outer space for warfare - such as providing imagery, performing reconnaissance, collecting intelligence, enhancing the accuracy of strikes, and enhancing communications - as well as denying space to adversaries.

The importance of the Aerospace Force is seen in the fact that it is directly subordinated to the Central Military Commission (CMC), the highest military body in China.

John Costello, writing an assessment for The Jamestown Foundation think tank in the USA, said the Aerospace Force does not strictly align with the PLA's regional theatre command construct. This indicates its strategic and functional mission, he asserted.

The PLA Aerospace Force has seven primary 'space bases', complemented by various bureaus and specialised centres that assure and support space missions.

The seven bases are as follows, and their names speak to the type of missions the force performs. Base 23 is the China Satellite Maritime Tracking and Control Department in Jiangsu Province. Base 25 is the Taiyuan Satellite Launch Centre in the mountains of Shanxi Province, and Base 26 is the Xi'an Satellite Control Centre in Shaanxi Province. Base 27 is the Xichang Satellite Launch Centre in Sichuan Province, whereas Base 35 is the newly formed Battlefield Environment Support Base in Wuhan. Base 36 is Kaifeng Base in Henan Province, and it appears focused on space equipment research and development, testing and evaluation, according to Costello.

Finally, Base 37 is the Early Warning Base in Lintong, Shaanxi Province. Its mission is space situational awareness, missile early warning and tracking space debris and satellites. Base 37 is thus in charge of several large phased-array radar sites across China to provide an overall picture of space activity and to detect foreign ballistic missiles.

Costello commented, 'The establishment of the PLA Aerospace Force is more than an administrative reform. It is a strategic statement about how the PRC views the role of space in modern military competition. In Chinese military literature, space is frequently referred to as the 'commanding heights' of future warfare, and the Aerospace Force's creation demonstrates the PLA's resolve to secure that high ground.'

Costello discerned several implications about China's space warfare intentions. One is that space is integral to PLA operations. 'By placing all military space capabilities under one service, the PLA seeks to ensure that space assets can be centrally managed and rapidly brought to bear in a conflict. As with the parallel Cyberspace Force and Information Support Force, the Aerospace Force is a bellwether of conflicts Beijing is preparing for.'

If China ever invades Taiwan, for instance, then the force would play a pivotal role from the outset. The PLA would attempt to secure space for its own use whilst simultaneously denying it to others.

As Costello observed, 'This reflects their doctrinal view that the US military heavily relies on satellite capabilities, succinctly captured in the phrase 'no satellite, no fight'.' Of course, reliance on space is a double-edged sword, for as China enhances its own capabilities, it becomes vulnerable to enemy action too.

The author noted, 'During initial phases of a conflict, the Aerospace Force would deploy navigation satellites to guide precision missile strikes, use ISR satellites for target acquisition, and employ anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons to disable or destroy enemy command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities.'

The second implication highlighted by Costello is that the Aerospace Force 'provides centralised space intelligence and attack capabilities, unencumbered by inter-service rivalries. Its technical reconnaissance satellites and the processing centres that interpret their data are unified, theoretically enabling faster targeting cycles and a more complete situational picture for decision-makers.'

Thirdly, the writer contended that the Aerospace Force 'emphasises space control and counter-space'. Its broad mission set encompasses space combat, and the PLA is becoming bolder and more provocative in its space behaviour. Costello added, 'With the Aerospace Force in charge, such activities (e.g., closely shadowing foreign satellites and testing co-orbital inspector satellites that could double as weapons) may further intensify under a clear military chain of command.'

Indeed, it is worth exploring this topic of counter-space further. China, although claiming its space activities have peaceful intent, is undoubtedly pursuing the ability to degrade or deny the use of space to countries like the USA. The US Space Force assessed, 'Intelligence suggests the PLA likely sees counter-space operations as a means to deter and counter US military intervention in a regional conflict. Moreover, PLA academics stress the necessity of 'destroying, damaging and interfering with the enemy's reconnaissance... and communications satellites' to 'blind and deafen the enemy'.'

China has already demonstrated its ASAT proclivities. In 2007 it shot down a defunct weather satellite in LEO, creating streams of unwanted debris that will remain in space for decades to come. The Pentagon assessed, 'That missile evolved into an operational ground-based system intended to target LEO satellites. The PLA actively trains on this system today.'

Furthermore, China intends fielding ASAT weapons with far greater reach, extending even to GEO satellites 36,000km away. In fact, China launched a ballistic object in 2013 that peaked at 30,000km, which is suggestive that China already possesses such a capability. This means practically no satellite is safe from China's reach.

In addition, China has developed and is experimenting with inspection and repair systems that could function as weapons. For example, in January 2022 the Shijian-21 satellite moved a derelict BeiDou navigation satellite into a graveyard orbit above GEO. The US noted, 'This technology could be used in future systems to grapple other satellites.' US officials have described some radical Chinese satellite manoeuvres as 'dogfighting' in space.

Such manoeuvrable objects could approach an adversary's satellites and physically interfere with, damage or dazzle them. Indeed, multiple Chinese SJ- and TJS-series experimental satellites have been observed conducting unusual, large and rapid manoeuvres. As just one example, a TJS-2 satellite was tracked maneuvering at a rapid speed of 44m/s. China may be learning to refuel satellites too.

The US-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) acknowledged, 'China continues to launch and operate highly manoeuvrable satellites, demonstrating an advanced level of technological and operational acumen that, if not already deployed for such purposes, could enable a formidable on-orbit counter-space arsenal. Through the use of these satellites, Chinese operators are gaining experience in developing tactics and procedures that can be used for space warfighting, to include both defensive and offensive advanced space operations.'

Erickson pointed out too, 'While America and its allies have capable countermeasures of their own, it is no longer credible to claim that Beijing may lack essential architecture for targeting its long-range precision strike systems, which include the world's most numerous conventional ballistic and cruise missiles.'

On the ground, China also has multiple laser weapons able to target sensors on enemy satellites. The US Space Force warned, 'By the mid- to late 2020s, they could have higher-power systems able to damage satellite structures.'

As well, PLA military exercises routinely rehearse employing jammers against space-based communications, radars and navigation systems like GPS. Notably, the US said in its April report, 'Intelligence suggests the PLA may be developing jammers to target satellite communications over a range of frequencies, including US military protected extremely high-frequency systems.' Returning to Costello's implications of the PLA Aerospace Force's growing capabilities, he highlighted the organization's technological advancements. 'The Aerospace Force is able to champion cutting-edge technologies vital for the next generation of warfare. Whether deploying satellite constellations for global surveillance, developing directed-energy weapons to target satellites, or fielding rapid-launch 'responsive space' capabilities, the Aerospace Force provides a focused command to drive these projects.'

The aforementioned laser ASATs are one example of this.

Another instance of advancing technologies is China's three reusable spaceplane launches to date. The first stayed in orbit just two days, but the second and third remained in space for approximately nine months each. The US pointed out that they released 'unidentified objects'. Simultaneously, China 'has made significant strides in developing reusable space launch vehicles'.

This includes a successful 12km-high vertical-take-off-and-landing test done last year. Reusable rockets are a key technology for meeting China's proliferated LEO constellation plans.

Although China is weak in terms of globally spread ground-based space situational awareness sensors - particularly because it does not have the global heft or international alliances to host such stations as the USA does - it has at least ten space-based space situational awareness satellites that do the same job.

Chinese government statements conceal the true purposes of its innumerable satellites, especially the more esoteric ones. However, it is clear that Xi and the PLA are reaching upwards to dominate space in times of peace and of war. After all, whoever controls space controls the initiative in war. (ANI)